Environmental Defense Institute

Troy, Idaho 83871-0220

208-835-5407 edinst@tds.net

To: Robert Bullock
Waste Management and Remediation Division
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N Hilton, Boise, ID 83876-1255

Public Comments for the Record
on the Mixed Hazardous-High-level Waste Tank
Closure Plans for INEEL

I. Summary

Environmental Defense Institute (EDI) offers this updated review and comments for the public record of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Idaho Nuclear Technology and Environmental Center (INTEC) mixed high-level radioactive and hazardous waste tank closure plan for tank numbers (WM-181-183-184-185-186) and Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE) tanks (VES-WL-123 and VES-WL-124) approved by Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ) June 16, 2004 Docket Numbers 10HW-0410, and 10HW-0411, and previous 10HW0204 10HW-0314, EPA ID No. ID4890008952.

EDI and David McCoy filed more than six petitions to the State of Idaho and various branches of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over the last two years to "Revoke INEEL INTEC tank closure permits." None of these formal requests apparently resulted in any substantive response to the essential issues of compliance with Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) or Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). For a complete listing and access to these and related supplemental submittals see EDI's website at:  http://www.environmental-defense-institute.org/publications

II. Comments on Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE) tank closures of (VES-WL-123 and VES-WL-124) and associated ancillary equipment approved by Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ) June 16, 2004 Notice of Intent Docket Number 10HW-0411.

For a complete discussion of these issues see our joint Notice of Intent to Sue DOE, EPA, and IDEQ "Over DOE's Failure to Comply with the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act, (42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq); the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.); the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.); Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300 F, et seq.); the National Environmental Policy Act ( 42 U.S.C. § 4332 et seq.); the floodplain/wetlands requirements of 10 CFR 1021 et seq.; DOE Orders 5400.1, 5400.5; Plaintiffs' rights to Due Process under the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative." www.environmental-defense-institute.org/publications

Given the July 2003 U.S. District Court judgement in NRDC vs. DOE, Case No. 01-CV.413 (BLW), the HWMA/RCRA Partial Closure Plan Permit for Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Complex (INTEC) WM-182 and WM-183 and Closure Plan for WM-184, 185, and 186 Tank Systems must be revoked. In addition to Judge Winmill's decision in the above cited case, we previously offered in formal submittals, NRDC's August 22, 2002 legal analysis letter to DOJ/DOE to substantiate our request. We note that the reason the NRDC suit was filed is to prevent precisely the type of tank closure that DOE is initiating and which IDEQ has authorized. IDEQ previously (11/14/03) approved a preliminary closure plan for three additional tanks, INTEC HLW tanks WM-184, 185, and 186 with notice in the Federal Register dated 11/14/03 and now (6/16/04) offers a revised permit plan that is not apparently substantively changed from the "preliminary plan."

Therefore, EDI again renews our formal request that the above permit(s) for INTEC HLW and PEWE HLW Tank Closures be revoked. Judge Winmill's Memorandum Decision states: "Thus, DOE's Order 435.1 must be declared invalid under Chevron. The Court will therefore grant NRDC's motion for summary judgement and deny DOE's cross motion [for dismissal]." ⁽¹⁾ Moreover, given Judge Winmill's decision, the DOE's INEEL High-level Waste Final Environmental Impact Statement (September 2002) must be considered inadequate and obsolete because most of the selected waste management operations are now by court order illegal. A fundamental assumption (now in question) is that INEEL HLW will go to DOE's Nevada Yucca Mt. site. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said that the government's standards for protecting the public at Yucca Mt. from radiation leaks at the repository which extend 10,000 years, were too short as determined by the National Academy of Sciences studies that show the after 270,000 years "an individual just outside the repository's fence would be subject to a radiation dose 60 times higher than the allowable limit." ⁽²⁾ Therefore the EIS must be updated and resubmitted for public comment.

DOE appealed the above Idaho U.S. District Court ruling to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, South Carolina, New Mexico, New York, and the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority filed a joint amici curiae brief in support of NRDC. ⁽³⁾ It is categorically, reprehensible, for IDEQ to be proceeding with these INEEL high-level waste tank permit closure plans prior to a ruling from the Court of Appeals especially given the fact that six states oppose the DOE closure plans for its high-level waste tanks that will leave high-level waste permanently interred in the tanks.

There appears to be a tragic irony when the Idaho Attorney General is a active party to this six state opposition to DOE's high-level tank closure plan, yet the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ) chooses to ignore this formidable legal dispute that will set a regulatory precedent on the disposition of this mixed hazardous and high-level radioactive waste into the foreseeable future.

EDI acknowledges receipt of IDEQ letters (4/16/02) and (5/22/02) to EDI, however IDEQ chose to characterize these requests solely as "Public Information Requests" and categorically ignore the fundamental request of the tank closure permit request. Additionally, EDI acknowledges receipt of IDEQ (6/16/04) letter and "Public Notice" and comment deadline of 7/19/04, and EPA Office of Inspector General report that states: " Furthermore, " IDEQ inspection records for INEEL covering the period form 1996- 2002 and permitting files covering the period from 1996-2003 showed that IDEQ has not verified DOE's compliance with the emission standards specified by Sub-part AA .." ⁽⁴⁾

EDI offers this review of DOE documentation on the contents of the subject INTEC HLW tank materials. Below is a table showing what limited information is available to EDI only as a result of several Public Information Requests to the State of Idaho, and not generally available to the public, and Freedom of Information Act requests to DOE.

Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center
Tank Farm Facility High-level Waste

The final INEEL HLW/EIS ⁽⁷⁾ puts the INTEC HLW (high-level waste) tank heels at between 5,000 and 20,000 gallons per tank, and makes no commitment to exhume the tank heels, only liquids extractable using existing jet pumps located 9.5 inches above the tank floor. ⁽⁸⁾ Given that all of the above eleven tanks are fifty feet in diameter, 9.5 inches of waste amounts to about 11,620.3 gallons. ⁽⁹⁾ At the EIS's upper limit of 20,000 gallons of heels in each of the eleven INTEC HLW tanks (a more reasonably conservative estimate), the total volume for all eleven tanks could be 220,000 gallons.

This conservative estimate of tank heel volume is especially pertinent given the presence of coolant coils in eight of the eleven Tank Farm HLW tanks that are about two feet above the bottom of the tanks. ⁽¹⁰⁾ See DOE's "Construction Photo of HLW Tank Interior" that offers a clear relational perspective of the tank coolant coil height and extensive matrix. ⁽¹¹⁾ This is a complex system of about forty individual coolant lines (each with individual tank penetration points) for each tank. ⁽¹²⁾ The photo shows the coolant lines on about one foot centers and two feet above the tank floor which would contain a volume at that level of about 29,360 gallons assuming a fifty-foot tank diameter.

Extraction of the ~ 29,360 gallons of tank heels in each tank or a total for the eight tanks with cooling coils of about 234,880 gallons without dedicated equipment capable of dislodging and exhuming the heels bound up in the cooling coils and related support structures, is extremely problematic. Again, DOE has made no binding commitment for any dedicated heel extraction equipment only utilizing existing jet pumps for the liquid contents above the 9.5 inch level.

For general discussion purposes the eight INTEC HLW tank heel totals (with cooling coils) at ~ 234,880 gallons (29,360 times eight) and three tanks at minimum heel volume of 11,620 gallons each (assuming a pump level of 9.5 inches) could leave potentially amount to about 289,500 gallons of high-level tank heels permanently in place under DOE's tank closure plans. ⁽¹³⁾

There are about 145 additional (not including the eleven Tank Farm units listed above) INTEC HLLW tanks (part of the INTEC Liquid Waste Management System ILWMS) with volume capacity of more than 440,000 gallons of waste that may also be left and grouted in place in DOE closure plans. ⁽¹⁴⁾ To date, DOE has not disclosed any comprehensive assessment of these 145 additional tanks, or their liquid waste and heel volumes. There is however some limited information on the activity content of some operations. For instance the New Waste Calcine Facility (NWCF) will retain 8,610 curies and the Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE) will retain 7,768 curies (decayed to 2016) after closure. [DOE/EIS-0287D (1999) pages C.9-9] Again, as discussed below, these figures are considered to be significantly understated.

Idaho Department Environmental Quality (IDEQ) approved closure plan for WM-182 & 183 in July 2003. The closure plan was approved (11/14/03) by IDEQ (Docket # 10HW-0314) for INTEC HLW tanks WM-184, 185, 186 that will be finalized 12/03. The same basic regulatory issues and alleged violations apply to both closure plans as discussed below.

The completed closure of the Waste Calcine Facility at INTEC demonstrates how DOE is proceeding to close other operations (in addition to the Docket Number 10HW-0314, HLW tanks) by grouting them in place. It must be noted that these (as well as the HLW tanks) are not a Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) compliant "clean closure" but a negotiated "performance-based" deal with the State of Idaho that would not otherwise meet regulatory requirements under RCRA or the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). "This DOE closure is designed to remove radionuclides to the extent technically and economically practicable. The quantity of radionuclides that can remain as residual in the tank system is based on performance assessments." ⁽¹⁵⁾ Also see alleged non-compliant closure of INTEC SFE-20 tank closures containing HLW.

Since INEEL started operations over five decades ago, "reprocessing of reactor fuel generated approximately 10 million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste, with more than 50 million curies of radioactivity." ⁽¹⁶⁾

This represents a volume to radioactivity relational rate of 1 to 5 (liquid to curie). Internal INEEL documents put the tank radioactive content at 40 curies/gallon. ⁽¹⁷⁾ If applied as a crude ball park to current activity level of the eleven INTEC HLW Tanks listed above would yield an activity curie content of about forty or fifty million curies, or many orders of magnitude more than what DOE and the State of Idaho are acknowledging to the general public. More importantly, the tank closure plan does not include this level of residual waste.

The radioactivity contained in the other 145 ancillary tanks in the INTEC Liquid Waste Management System, discussed above, is not appropriately included in the tank closure plan risk assessment for the whole INTEC site. Therefore, the risk-based closure plan is fundamentally flawed on numerous crucial factors.

This represents an enormous amount of radioactivity that DOE and the state intend to leave permanently in the Big Lost River flood zone and above the Snake River Plain Aquifer. To put these radioactivity levels into perspective with respect to their deadly nature, EPA's drinking water standards for these radionuclides are in units of pico curies per liter or one trillionth of one curie.

Tank heels contain significantly higher radioactivity content than the liquid portion especially with respect to heavy long-lived transuranic elements like plutonium, uranium, and neptunium that tend to settle out into the tank heels. ⁽¹⁸⁾ DOE claims that the tanks undergoing closure do not contain high-level waste, yet up until 1997 they received first cycle raffinate (unrefuted as a high-level waste) which means the dominate tank heels will contain HLW. Moreover, the extensive ongoing use at INEEL of high-level liquid waste (HLLW) evaporators that burn off excess liquid containing volatile hazardous (i.e. mercury) and radioactive (i.e. tritium and C-14) portions of the waste to the atmosphere, means the current residual tank waste will have an even higher concentration of the non-volatile radioactive (i.e. plutonium) and hazardous waste constituents (i.e. cadmium, chromium, and lead). ⁽¹⁹⁾

Internal INEEL reports (see previous EDI submittals to EPA/IOG on internal INEEL reports on tank closure) confirm that grout when dumped into the tank does not mix with the residual tank waste, nor does it flow underneath the tank heels as DOE claims in its publications. Additionally, grout dumped into the tank vault between the tank and concrete vault does not flow underneath the tank as DOE claims. Therefore, the waste Risk Calculation "fate-transport" model assumptions used by DOE to show impact of waste migration on Snake River Aquifer are not credible because (among other reasons) they do not include residual waste. ⁽²⁰⁾ Moreover, this inability to fully mix grout with the residual tank heel waste and test the resulting mixture for homogeneity and resistance to waste leachate, is a violation of RCRA clean closure standards. ⁽²¹⁾ DOE's EIS "assumed grout failure" in the risk assessment at 500 years, which is ludicrous given the toxic hazardous half-life (tens-of-thousands of years) of constituent radionuclides in the tank heels, and the fact that toxic heavy metals have no half-life. ⁽²²⁾ As previously discussed, long-half-life decay "daughter" products (with even longer half-lives) of radionuclides in the tank heels is not included in the tank risk assessment closure plans. DOE can not claim a credible risk assessment without including the entire "decay chain" for each radionuclide contaminate and the perpetual time this waste will continue to migrate into the aquifer.

DOE/ID's INTEC HLW tank closure plan includes "landfill" rationale. ⁽²³⁾ This, in view of the recent Federal Court ruling in NRDC vs. DOE, is patently illegal. INTEC and the subject HLW tanks (the bottoms of which are some 40 feet below the flood level) are within the Big Lost River 100-year flood plain and therefore do not meet RCRA, NRC or NWPA criteria as a permanent disposal site for high-level waste. ⁽²⁴⁾

Additionally, EDI requests, in view of the court ruling, a review of the IDEQ INEEL INTEC tank closure permits related to INTEC tanks WM-182 and 183 closure (Docket # 10HW-0204) and INTEC SFE-20 tank closure permit (Docket # 10HW-0203), and IDEQ Closure Permit for the INTEC Waste Calcine Facility [Docket # 10HW0305] and related tanks containing high-level waste as defined by the 7/3/03 U.S. District Court Decision that states in pertinent part: "... the solids sink to the bottom, forming a sludge, leaving the liquids on top. This physical separation is analogous to the NWPA's definition for separation: The liquid and solids are treated differently by the Act. While NWPA allows DOE to treat the solids to remove fission products, thereby permitting reclassification of the waste, NWPA does not offer the option of reclassification for liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing." ⁽²⁵⁾ Judge Winmill's decision therefore applies to all INEEL tanks containing high-level waste. The wastes that are from reprocessing are not to be left in any of the tanks at INEEL and merely grouted.

EDI further notes that the NRDC vs DOE decision must be applied to the tanks (as previously noted) associated with the Waste Calcine Facility ("WCF"), the New Waste Calciner Facility ("NWCF"), including but not limited to the Calciner itself and the tanks for the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator, Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE), Liquid Effluent Treatment Disposal (LET&D), and other INTEC Liquid Waste Management System tanks. The contents of these tanks should be slated for RCRA clean closure and waste removal from the state of Idaho and not allowed to enter into the ongoing CERCLA process of INEEL onsite burial.

A major part of DOE's rationale for permanently leaving waste in the Tank Farm is its claim that the tanks themselves have never leaked, and the integrity of tanks adds significant containment to the waste as a disposal unit. Recently declassified secret ICPP/INTEC contractor reports gained by the Environmental Defense Institute through FOIA state that, "Radioactive waste solution escaped from permanent waste storage tanks WM-187 and WM-185 to respective concrete tank vaults."

"On March 16, it was observed that the sump in the concrete vault for WM-187 was full; and the liquid level in WM-187 was dropping. It was suspected that WM-187 had failed, and operations were started to transfer WM-187 to WM-186 and to transfer solution in tank vault to WM-187 as this is the only way to empty the vault. By this time the tank vault was emptied, 74,230 gallons of solution (including jet dilution) had been transferred to an empty tank WM-186. At this time the level in WM-187 ceased to drop, and the level was presumed to be below the leak in the tank.

On March 19, the sump in the vault for WM-185 was observed to be filling and the tank level was dropping. The vault sump jet was put into operation to empty the vault into WM-185, and preparations were made to transfer WM-185 to WM-188. A volume of 32,800 gallons was lost to the tank vault. Since two waste tanks, WM-187 and WM-185, had apparently failed within three days, the coincidence did not appear credible." ⁽²⁶⁾

It is uncertain if the tank releases noted above were due to vessel leaks or to plumbing problems related to tank vault sump jet pumps. The State of Idaho INEEL Oversight Program also raised similar issues in recent years related to excessive volumes in the tank vault sumps where it was determined that waste service line leaks contributed to unusually high volumes that required extraction from the tank vaults. A 1994 State of Idaho investigation showed that over a twenty-three month period (11/92 - 9/94) about 123,500 gallons of contaminated water was pumped from the tank vault sumps. The investigation concluded that the source of the water was precipitation, irrigation, and leaking high-level tank waste system lines. ⁽²⁷⁾ DOE notes in a internal 1999 report that some 2,000 gallons/yr of waste are pumped from the INTEC high-level tank farm sumps which could be tank leaks, service lines, or from other unknown sources. ⁽²⁸⁾

Moreover, given the known porosity (inability to contain liquid waste) of the tank vaults, it is a reasonable assumption that a significant volume in addition to 2,000 gal/yr pumped from the sumps are responsible for the massive groundwater contamination under the tanks. Regardless of the source of waste in the tank sumps (within the HLW tank vaults), this is high-level waste that must be managed appropriately according to federal stature and regulatory law. Any reasonable analysis would determine that the documented massive soil and ground water contamination beneath the Tank Farm originated therein.

DOE's reliance on these failed high-level tank concrete containment vaults for permanent disposal of high-level waste under a new DOE Order 435.1 is misguided and puts the general public and future generations at significant risk. As previously noted, the Natural Resources Defense Council, together with numerous Native American Tribes and environmental groups, is currently challenging this DOE Order in US Federal Court. ⁽²⁹⁾ Because the INEEL sits directly atop the Snake River Plain Aquifer, designated by US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a regional sole source aquifer, protection of this aquifer is a main component of the 1995 Settlement Agreement between the State of Idaho and DOE. ⁽³⁰⁾

Past and current high-level and transuranic waste mismanagement practices have resulted in massive contamination of the groundwater under the INEEL operations. This recognized groundwater contaminate pathway represents a significant hazard to the general public solely with current contaminate levels. Migration of buried waste contaminates into underlying soil and perched ground-water zones is extensively studied by US Geologic Survey and their report notes: "These zones are an integral part of the pathway for contaminates to move to the Snake River Plain Aquifer. Water moves rapidly through surficial [sic] sediments ..." ⁽³¹⁾ As previously cited, Plutonium-239-240 have been detected under INEEL at 66 pCi/L, or 4.4 times the drinking water standard . ⁽³²⁾ This plutonium contamination represents a clear present and future danger to aquifer and or Snake River, Columbia River communities that rely on this crucial water resource.

For more information contact:
Chuck Broscious, Executive Director, Environmental Defense Institute, P. O. Box 220
Troy, ID 83871-0220 208-835-5407 edinst@tds.net

CC: via email:

Nikki Tinsley, EPA Inspector General
Charles McCollum, EPA Divisional Inspector General
Michael Owen, EPA/IG Seattle
Jeff Hunt
Carolyn Copper
Phil Weihrouch
Madeline Mullen
Janet Kessler

INEEL\ICPP Tanks\INTEC Tank Closure.com .Final.4

EndNotes:

1. U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, Natural Resources Defense Council, et al, v. Spencer Abraham, Secretary, Dept. of Energy, Civ. No. 01-0413-S-BLW, Memorandum Decision, July 3, 2003, page 12. Hereinafter referred to as NRDC v. DOE.

2. Wald, Matthew, L., "Court Sets Back Federal Project on Atom Waste Site's Safety, " New York Times, 7/10/04

3. Natural Resources Defense Council, et al., v Spencer Abraham, Secretary, Department of Energy, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 03-35711, Motion for Leave to Participate in Oral Argument by Amici Curiae, June 25,2004.

4. Evaluation Report: Review of EPA's Response to Petition Seeking Withdrawal of Authorization for Idaho's Hazardous Waste Program Report No. 2004-P-00006 (February 5, 2004) page 10.

5. Salt Lake Tribune October 19,2003, Associated Press story "Idaho wants support in reclassifying liquid waste."

6. Idaho High-level Waste and Facilities Disposition, Final Environmental Impact Statement, September 2002, page C.9-37, referred hereafter as DOE/EIS-0287.

7. DOE/EIS-0287, page 2-14.

8. DOE/EIS-0287 page 2-14 and DOE/ID-10802, 12/20/00, pg A-19

9. It is a credible assumption to put the minimum amount of waste in each of the tank bottoms at 11,620 gallons since only the existing jet pumps are used. Therefore, the above table listing DOE heel volumes of only 5,000 gallons of tank heels must be considerably understated by about 6,620 (11,620 - 5,000) gallons per tank or an additional 33,100 gallons for those five tanks listed at only 5,000 gallons.

10. Idaho Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation Recovery Act Closure Plan for Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center Tanks WM-182 and WM-183, DOE/ID-10802, November 2001, page 2.

11. INEEL, Status and Path Forward for Treatment of INTEC Sodium-Bearing Waste, Joel Case and Keith Lochie DOE/ID 1/14/2003, presentation, that includes a man standing at the bottom of a HLLW tank among coolant coils.

12. INTEC Tank Farm Facility Closure VES-WM-182 Plan View, page 27, and VES-183, page 28, DOE/ID-10802 Revision 0.

13. Assumptions in this "general purpose discussion" are; 1.) tank diameter is 50 feet; 2.) cooling coils are about two feet above the bottom of the tank based on the cited photo depiction of the tank interior; 3.) there are eight tanks with cooling coils as stated in DOE/ID-10802 page 2; 4.) the remaining three HLW tanks do not contain coolant coils and the existing jet pumps are 9.5 inches above the bottom of the tank as previously cited in DOE/ID-10802.

14. See EDI Tank List Report on INTEC Liquid Waste Management System, Rev, 13, 11/17/03.

15. DOE/ID-10802, Revision 0, page 12.

16. Affidavit of Kathleen Trever, State of Idaho Coordinator-Manager for INEEL Oversight, 3/24/03, in NRDC v. DOE.

17. DOE's own tank closure plan (not readily available to the general public) also notes activity level as high as 40 curies per gallon. [DOE/ID-10802, 11/01, page 5]

18. INEEL/EXT-01-00666, Revision 2, August 2002, page 47.

19. Sampling and Analysis Plan for the Post Decontamination Characterization of WM-182 and WM-183 Tank Residuals, INEEL/EXT-01-0066 Rev 2, 8/02, page 44

20. DOE/ID-10802, 12/20/00, pg. B-2]

21. See 40 CFR 264.111 and 265.111and 40 CFR 268.48 Toxic Characteristics Leachate Procedure (TCLP) that also mandates the final waste form must contain contaminates verified by sampling to validate RCRA permit requirements. None of these requirements are being met at INEEL's grouting of high-level waste.

22. DOE/EIS-0287, page C.9-37.

23. DOE/ID-10841, December 2000.

24. See 40 CFR 270.14, 264.8 and 265.18 prohibitions in 100 year flood plains.

25. See Note # 1, page 10.

26. CPP Production Monthly Report No. 24, February 26 through March 26, 1962, Ay-49-62A, page 5 Phillips Petroleum, Idaho Operations Office.

27. 27 Investigative Evaluate Report, State of Idaho INEEL Oversight Program 1994 Progress Report, page 10.

28. Trip, J.L. et al "INEEL Radioactive Liquid Waste Reduction Program" Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Co. March 4, 1999, page 7.

29. 29 Natural Resources Defense Council et al. vs. Department of Energy, US District Court for the District of Idaho, Civil No 91-0035. Co-plaintiffs, as of this writing, include Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, and Snake River Alliance.

30. 30 Public Service Co. v. Batt, No. CV91-0035 S- EJL, US Federal Court for the State of Idaho, 1995 Settlement Agreement, page 8.

31. - - - -

32. 32 Idaho INEEL Oversight Program Report, December 2000, page 25.